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Let me begin by saying that I am not here to lecture, 
but rather to learn. Today, I would like to talk about a 
couple of things. First, I would like to start with some 
themes that emerged from a roundtable discussion 
that the Federal Reserve held last year with industry 
leaders on emerging issues involving fraud in the re-
tail payments system. This is important to the Federal 
Reserve. The outputs from the roundtable are used to 
direct the Federal Reserve’s research and inform its 
work. Thus, hearing your perspectives on those themes 
today is important. The second thing I would like to 
talk about is an area in which I have been doing research. 
These are the emerging trends in new account fraud 
detection for applicants on the Internet, where businesses 
are not physically present to authenticate the identity 
of customers. As everybody here knows, this is an 
area of growing interest throughout the banking industry. 
Findings from the roundtable discussion on 
retail payments fraud
Let me start with the roundtable that the Federal 
Reserve sponsored last year. Fourteen industry experts—
including merchants and representatives from payments 
system providers, financial institutions, and law enforce-
ment organizations—participated. Overall, these leaders 
agreed that, although the current level of payments fraud 
is being effectively managed and does not represent a 
crisis, organizations must constantly adapt to keep pace 
with criminal activity and with changes in technology 
and payment methods. While the dollar amount of fraud 
relative to business revenues in the United States is 
likely declining, the costs associated with fraud miti-
gation are substantial and increasing. The roundtable 
discussions focused on four main themes: 1) the chang-
ing landscape of retail payments fraud, 2) current trends, 
3) emerging concerns, and 4) areas for improvement 
in fraud detection and prevention. The following 
paragraphs sum up our discussions involving these 
four themes. 
The changing landscape of retail  
payments fraud
Despite declining use of checks across the coun-
try, industry leaders find that the largest number of 
fraud attempts remains in check payments. Fraud losses 
are also highest for checks on a comparative basis 
with other payment methods. A number of participants 
stated that business losses resulting from check fraud 
are significantly higher than losses from noncheck 
payment types because checks are relatively easy to 
alter or forge, using readily available printers, scan-
ners, and computer software. 
Moreover, changes in the payments system and 
in criminal behavior have introduced additional risk. 
One key change in the payments system has been the 
proliferation of commerce conducted over the Internet. 
The Internet has created new means for criminals to 
gain access to consumers’ personal and financial in-
formation, and has facilitated the formation of exten-
sive illegal networks through which criminals buy 
and sell this information without the limits of geogra-
phy. Indeed, substantial Internet fraud operations are 
now linked to sites located in certain developing coun-
tries. The Internet has also accelerated worldwide in-
formation-sharing among criminals regarding successful 
fraudulent schemes, so that new fraud techniques now 
move quickly around the world. In addition, the growth 
in online commerce has led to an increase in the num-
ber of transactions in which merchants are not physi-
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That said, some changes in the payments system 
have helped reduce risk, such as faster clearing of 
check payments associated with Check 211 and 
check-to-automated-clearinghouse (ACH) conversion. 
Being able to clear payments more quickly can mean 
that a fraudulent check may be returned before a col-
lecting bank makes funds available to the depositor. 
At a minimum, faster returns help inform banks and 
their customers that fraud is taking place. But some 
feel that ACH e-check payments may be more vulner-
able to fraud than other ACH standard code categories, 
such as ACH transactions initiated via telephone. Con-
cerns were also raised over the greater use of check 
images in the rapidly growing Check 21 environment, 
which could reduce the usefulness of some current 
check security features that may not survive the im-
aging process. 
Further, criminals’ ability to adapt to changes in 
the industry’s practices in fraud detection and fraud 
prevention is a continuing challenge, as these lawbreakers 
continue to seek the path of least resistance. For ex-
ample, as large merchants and banks develop new tools 
to detect and prevent fraud, criminals turn to small- 
and medium-sized enterprises because they are less 
likely to have the resources to invest in fraud detec-
tion and prevention. Because fraud affects the entire 
financial industry, some feel that it is the duty of larg-
er businesses and banks to reach out to educate and 
aid smaller organizations. Others suggest that we 
should raise the bar by increasing criminal penalties 
for fraud and prosecuting fraud more rigorously. 
Current trends 
It is becoming increasingly important for firms to 
protect consumer information. Industry leaders are 
concerned about the potential damage to their brands’ 
reputations in the event of a data breach. The industry 
has taken steps to protect consumers from fraud that 
may result from compromised information. Often, for 
evidence of fraud, banks and card networks monitor 
customer accounts that may have been compromised 
and then reissue cards when necessary. Some industry 
leaders argued that, although the storage of data is a 
potentially vulnerable point in the payments system, 
the extent to which compromised information has  
actually been used is relatively low. 
In many instances, if consumer information is com-
promised and subsequently used to commit payments 
fraud, the consumer is not liable for the associated 
losses. Thus, while it is important to protect consum-
er data, it is equally important to develop tools to pre-
vent the fraudulent use of data or to otherwise render 
data unusable. One example is phishing.2 While 
phishing is a current threat to the security of consumer 
information, many believe that the level of actual loss 
incurred from phishing has been relatively low in the 
aggregate. In some cases, education has been reason-
ably effective in preventing consumers from divulging 
information online. 
In addition, it is important to differentiate between 
“payments fraud” and “identity theft.” While both are  
a crime, the ramifications of each are substantially 
different. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
defined the term “identity theft” as fraud perpetrated 
by 1) obtaining access to and illegally using a con-
sumer’s existing financial information, such as a per-
son’s credit card number or bank account number, or 
2) illicitly obtaining identity information about a con-
sumer to open new financial accounts in the consumer’s 
name. The roundtable participants generally agreed 
that the second part of the FTC’s definition should be 
considered “identity theft” and that the first part should 
be considered “payments fraud.” Some stated that the 
FTC report used an overly broad definition of identity 
theft, which has led to an overestimate of the true fre-
quency of this type of fraud. Nevertheless, the conse-
quences of true identity theft can be very significant 
for consumers. While actual financial losses might be 
low, the impact on a consumer’s credit record—and 
the time and effort required to correct that record—
can be substantial. 
Emerging concerns
As noted, criminals are continually searching for 
weaknesses in fraud detection and fraud prevention 
practices. Several participants said that the potential 
movement of check-based fraud to the ACH network 
is an area of growing concern for the industry. A fraud-
ulent payment initiated with a check can move into 
the ACH system through a point-of-purchase (POP), 
back-office-conversion (BOC), or accounts-receivable-
conversion (ARC) transaction. Since ACH has tradi-
tionally been used for recurring payments from trusted 
sources only, banks may not yet have robust tools in 
place to detect fraudulent ACH payments from other 
sources. Fraudulent checks that may be detected using 
existing tools might, therefore, go undetected if pro-
cessed on the ACH network. This possibility is a particu-
lar concern to businesses that use check fraud prevention 
services, such as positive pay,3 that are not available 
for ACH payments. While a concern, fraud of this  
nature is, at present, relatively low. 
The industry has only recently begun monitoring 
the movement of fraud across payment channels. Perhaps 
further study is required to understand how fraud is 
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or between different electronic instruments. Banks 
and businesses are looking to adopt a holistic approach 
to detecting and preventing retail payments fraud across 
the spectrum of payments systems. One participant 
described this approach as managing fraud at the “re-
lationship” level—that is, at the level of an individual 
or a corporate client for a bank, and a customer for a 
merchant—rather than at the “product,” or payment 
instrument, level.
Moreover, the industry is concerned that the in-
troduction of new payments instruments, such as pre-
paid cards, could increase fraud in the payments system. 
One participant noted that some of these cards can be 
easily reloaded with funds and can be used anonymously, 
making them effective vehicles for money laundering. 
Another stated that open-loop, reloadable prepaid cards 
could be a primary vehicle for fraud in the future, and 
others concurred that prepaid cards are a growing area 
of concern. We also discussed the security of mobile 
and contactless card transactions. On the one hand, pay-
ments made using these devices could be more exposed 
depending on their security features. On the other hand, 
the development of security enhancements, such as 
“dynamic” authorization techniques, for some payment 
devices can offer significant benefits. The hesitation in 
trusting emerging payments instruments may stem from 
the fact that their risks are not yet understood. Success-
ful payments systems have historically had to put inno-
vative systems into production and undergo a learning 
phase before the development of a fully mature risk-
mitigation strategy. 
Areas for improvement in fraud  
detection and prevention 
At the roundtable, the most discussed suggestions 
for improving the industry’s ability to detect and pre-
vent retail payments fraud were 1) increasing industry 
collaboration and information sharing, 2) using enhanced 
authentication techniques, and 3) adopting Payment 
Card Industry (PCI) standards. 
Merchants and financial institutions could benefit 
from increased collaboration and information sharing 
across industries and within their own business sectors, 
including through the development of best practices in 
fraud detection. Firms need to not only detect fraudu-
lent transactions in process but also prevent fraud’s 
initial occurrence by improving authentication at the 
point of sale. At the roundtable, the effectiveness of 
PIN (personal identification number) and chip tech-
nology was debated. Some stated that fraud rates on 
PIN debit cards are significantly lower than those for 
other payment types; as a result, they advocated the 
application of PIN security to card payments in general. 
Chip technology has been widely adopted in other 
countries, and could prove to be a safer alternative to 
magnetic stripe technology for card-based transactions. 
Roundtable participants also discussed the role 
of the Payment Card Industry program, developed 
jointly by Visa and MasterCard. Full compliance with 
security standards could help the industry safeguard 
consumers’ personal and financial information. The 
PCI program in particular could be helpful, but there 
are challenges for some organizations to become 
compliant with the PCI program. Nevertheless, com-
pliance with the PCI program might be a good first 
step in securing consumer information, though other 
opportunities exist. For example, existing data privacy 
regimes generally apply to banks or merchants, while 
they exclude others, such as third-party service pro-
viders. These third parties have access to consumers’ 
personal and financial information. In order to improve 
the security of consumer information, it is desirable to 
expand data protection regimes with respect to both 
the types of payments and the types of organizations 
that are included. 
Ultimately, the roundtable discussions returned 
to the refrain that criminals will continue to search 
for the fastest and easiest ways to commit payments 
fraud. Consequently, strategies for fraud detection 
and fraud prevention should be considered holistically, 
so as not to merely shift fraud from one payments 
channel to another. Industry leaders maintain that it is 
not financially feasible to prevent all payments fraud. 
Rather, businesses must make prudent, risk-based de-
cisions that will yield appropriate returns relative to 
the investment required to minimize fraud. Organiza-
tions continue to balance costs and benefits when in-
vesting in tools to mitigate fraud. 
At the roundtable’s conclusion, several sugges-
tions emerged for how the Federal Reserve might  
assist the industry’s efforts to mitigate fraud. Some 
advised the Federal Reserve to continue its outreach 
events to encourage industry participants to share 
concerns and effective practices, and others empha-
sized the importance of the Federal Reserve conduct-
ing research on payments and fraud-related issues.  
As a general matter, however, leaders advocated the 
continued application of market-driven approaches to 
keep payments fraud at a manageable level. Payments 
system participants’ ability to adapt to changes in crim-
inal behavior will be critical in maintaining a safe and 
efficient payments system. 
Some thoughts on new account fraud
Shifting gears now, I would like to offer my per-
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fraud in new accounts. Many companies with an on-
line presence today are struggling to find solutions for 
screening out fraudulent applicants for new accounts. 
These accounts range from those used for banking 
and brokerage accounts to accounts used for services. 
The dilemma is universal for online businesses where 
there is no person-to-person discussion with the ap-
plicant and, therefore, no possibility to examine doc-
uments such as driver’s licenses or passports and to 
verify identity in person. New account fraud in such 
non-person-to-person (mainly online) environments 
is estimated by some experts to be four to five times 
higher than it is when accounts are opened in person.
Although there is no comprehensive solution 
available in the market today, various methods can 
help detect accounts opened for illicit purposes. In the 
case of regulated banks, meaningful attempts must be 
made to detect new account fraud under the new “red 
flags regulations” that were fully implemented by 
November 2008 (I discuss these regulations in greater 
detail later). This is true whether the ultimate victim 
is a consumer, whose identity has been stolen, or the 
business itself, where an account is opened using a 
fictitious identity created by a criminal.
Client device identification
In the non-person-to-person online environment, 
a business does not have an opportunity to screen iden-
tity documents, videotape the person, and/or engage 
directly with the applicant. However, the business does 
have an opportunity to screen the user’s device, such 
as a personal computer. Various technologies make 
device identification and analysis a useful first step in 
flagging suspect applicants. For first-time users, busi-
nesses can obviously not rely on installed desktop soft-
ware, tokens, or credentials that have already been 
installed. However, they can analyze various pieces 
of information available through the user’s web browser 
connection to check for potentially fraudulent activity. 
These include the following.
n  Geolocation of the user based on the user’s Internet 
protocol (IP) address. Vendors that specialize in 
IP address intelligence are often able to detect 
the use of blacklisted IP addresses or blocks of 
addresses (that is, those that have been known to 
be used for criminal activity). They can detect 
the use of anonymizers and/or proxy servers that 
criminals use to hide their locations. Businesses 
can also compare the country and geographical 
region of the IP address to the country and region 
from the user’s credit card billing address. 
n  Personal computer/web browser identification 
examines the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) 
browser header and other information from the 
user’s computer or device, and compares them  
to what are expected. For example, this process 
can compare the time stamp from the computer 
to the time expected from the user’s geolocation. 
Using a JavaScript executed from the business’s 
server, this software can try to uniquely identify 
a computer and determine if it is being used by  
a large number of account applications. Software 
is available today that specializes in computer 
identification using proprietary techniques along 
with geolocation analysis. Similarly, a biometric 
system that records a user’s keystrokes and unique 
typing pattern can be used to ascertain if the same 
person, and not just the same machine, is opening 
multiple accounts. 
n  Botnet detection can identify a machine on a 
criminally run botnet that is accessing an enter-
prise’s website. 
Fraud detection using information on the 
account application
Device identification tests can be subject to further 
fraud screening through the use of information entered 
on the application. Depending on the information re-
quested on the application form, these fraud detection 
strategies can include the following.
n  Identity proofing, which is typically used when a 
comprehensive set of information is being requested 
from the user, such as financial data, Social  
Security number, employment history, and home-
ownership information. This is common when 
applications are filled out for financial accounts, 
such as insurance, credit card, and bank accounts. 
Identity proofing can be relatively expensive, at  
a few dollars for each identity checked, and uses 
either:
–  Rule-based data-matching systems from  
vendors or credit bureaus; or
–  Identity scoring, relying on service and  
software providers that detect potential  
fraud using scoring models that look across 
application records and data.
n Credit card fraud detection, which is useful for 
new account openings that require only a credit 
card authorization. This detection typically costs 
about 15 cents to 25 cents per transaction, on top 
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volume and vendor-licensing arrangements. These 
systems analyze data available from credit card 
records, such as billing address and shipping  
address. They perform various checks, such as 
validating addresses using the card companies’ 
address verification system, and compare credit 
card billing and shipping addresses to the cus-
tomer’s geolocation and to lists of suspect ad-
dresses. The systems check to see how many 
times the end-user accesses a webpage asking for 
credit card information—possibly an indication 
of a brute force attack against a card’s security 
code. Credit card fraud detection systems also 
can compare credit card numbers provided by the 
user with stolen cards noted on blacklists, al-
though stolen credit cards are so readily available 
to the fraudsters that blacklists have limited val-
ue. Most systems for credit card fraud detection 
enable enterprises to manage the business rules 
that each of their transactions runs against, so the 
businesses can catch fraud patterns particular to 
their situations.
n Niche data verification, which refers to the verifi-
cation of specific data, such as telephone numbers 
or applicants’ ages. These data are then recon-
ciled with data expected from the applicant. The 
line information database is a telecommunica-
tions industry standard database containing the 
same information made available through hub 
providers. Unfortunately, it is still not possible 
for enterprises to get access to a comprehensive 
set of wireless phone directories held privately 
by some wireless carriers (notably Verizon  
Wireless)—a step critical in verifying phone 
numbers because many customers prefer listing 
cellphone numbers rather than landline numbers. 
Stepped-up applicant verification
Optimally, all account applications should go 
through a set of initial screening procedures, and sus-
pect transactions that need further review should be 
routed to a fraud investigation queue for manual or 
automated follow-up. Additional automated screening 
can occur using one of the following methods.
n Identity proofing is a method that uses knowledge-
based authentication systems, based on public 
source data that pose questions to the user that 
only he or she can presumably answer (such as 
“What was the make of the first car you owned?”). 
Vendors offer identity-proofing applications  
based on public records, which can be partially 
effective in screening out fraud. However, roughly 
20 percent of the question/answer sessions invoked 
for high-risk applications fail or are abandoned. 
Sometimes, the failure is because legitimate users 
cannot successfully answer the questions or be-
cause there is not enough public data available 
for a particular individual. At other times, crimi-
nals manage to answer questions successfully.
n Telephone-based user verification is a method 
that relies on a call to an applicant using a phone 
number found in the public records or provided 
by the user personally. The automated phone  
system can simply ask the user to speak, and it 
can record the user’s voice or ask the user to type 
in the phone transaction number generated by the 
online application session. This method is not 
foolproof unless the business is sure that the phone 
number on record belongs to a legitimate user. 
Implications of red flags regulations
On October 1, 2007, the Federal Trade Commission 
and federal banking regulators, including the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office 
of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union 
Administration, released rules that require financial 
institutions to step up efforts to combat identity-theft-
related fraud. These long-awaited identity theft rules 
implement the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act, or FACT Act, and took effect on January 1, 
2008. Financial institutions covered by the rules had 
until November 2008 to comply. 
The rules require regulated financial institutions 
to create “reasonable policies and procedures” for  
detecting and preventing identity theft. Red flags cited 
in connection with an account application or an exist-
ing account include patterns of activity that are incon-
sistent with the historical and usual pattern of an 
account, such as a recent and significant increase in 
inquiry volume or an unusual number of recently es-
tablished credit relationships. Other red flags include 
applicant addresses that do not match addresses from 
external sources, as well as internally inconsistent per-
sonal information, such as a lack of correlation be-
tween the Social Security number range and the date 
of birth. Institutions are also asked to check for invalid 
phone numbers or addresses and to flag applications 
for which an address, Social Security number, or phone 
number provided is the same as that submitted by other 
persons opening an account or by other customers. 36 1Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
Conclusion
As we ponder retail payments fraud going forward, 
the risk is not just about the cost of dealing with fraud 
and the associated losses. Indeed, fraud risks and as-
sociated retail payments fraud will cross into areas of 
public policy related to privacy. Today privacy is  
becoming a serious issue, and interestingly, this issue 
brings us full circle to the broader topic of informa-
tion security.
Government agencies, for example, have a new 
mandate in terms of handling information about citi-
zens: It is called private identity information. Federal 
agencies must take affirmative action to protect private 
information such as Social Security numbers, dates of 
birth, etc. Moreover, today the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security has an assistant secretary for cyber 
security and communications. That position centralizes 
the federal government’s work in this area as well. 
Other agencies that work on privacy and identity  
issues related to payments fraud include the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Federal  
Reserve System. Concerns about terrorist financing 
and money laundering drive much of this federal 
work, but we should remember that such concerns are 
also increasingly spilling over into the world of pay-
ments fraud. In the future, you should see additional 
coordination and partnerships between the public  
sector and the private sector to address risk. 
I think it is important to understand that the  
Federal Reserve System is unique in that it acts as a 
banker’s bank, the federal government’s bank, and a 
payments system operator. Having a payments system 
that is safe and secure is an absolute necessity in main-
taining the confidence and trust held in it. To achieve 
this, we must focus on operations risk first, but also 
pay attention to reputational risk. It is important for 
us to understand these risks from multiple perspec-
tives—from the economic research perspective, from 
the perspective of a financial market authority, and 
from the perspective of a very large bank.
NOTES
1For details on the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, see 
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/truncation/.
2A phishing attack uses randomly distributed emails to attempt to 
trick recipients into disclosing personal information, such as ac-
count numbers, passwords, or Social Security numbers. See www.
spamlaws.com/online-credit-card-fraud.html.
3Positive pay is an antifraud service offered by virtually every U.S. 
commercial bank. It protects a company from altered checks and 
counterfeit check fraud by comparing the components (such as the 
account number, check number, and dollar amount) of each check 
presented for payment against those from a list of checks previously 
authorized and issued by the company. It allows a company to re-
ject unauthorized transactions (that is, for checks that do not 
match) before losses occur.